Every computer
must have an administrator: someone who can install software, configure the
operating system, add and manage user accounts, establish policies, and handle
all the other management tasks associated with keeping a computer up and
running. By definition, these tasks require that he have control over the
computer. This puts the administrator in a position of unequalled power. An
untrustworthy administrator can negate every other security measure you’ve
taken. He can change the permissions on the computer, modify the system
security policies, install malicious software, add bogus users, or do any of a
million other things. He can subvert virtually any protective measure in the
operating system, because he controls it. Worst of all, he can cover his
tracks. If you have an untrustworthy administrator, you have absolutely no
security.
When hiring a system administrator,
recognize the position of trust that administrators occupy, and only hire
people who warrant that trust. Call his references, and ask them about his
previous work record, especially with regard to any security incidents at
previous employers. If appropriate for your organization, you may also consider
taking a step that banks and other security-conscious companies do, and require
that your administrators pass a complete background check at hiring time, and
at periodic intervals afterward. Whatever criteria you select, apply them
across the board. Don’t give anyone administrative privileges on your network
unless they’ve been vetted and this includes temporary employees and
contractors, too.
Next,
take steps to help keep honest people honest. Use sing in/sing out sheets to
track who’s been in the server room. (You do have a server room with a locked
door, right? If not, re read Law #3). Implement a”two person” rule when
installing or upgrading software. Diversify management tasks as much as
possible, as a way of minimizing how much power any one administrator has.
Also, don’t use the Administrator account instead, give each administrator a
separate account with administrative privileges, so you can tell who’s doing
what. Finally, consider taking steps to make it more difficult for a rogue
administrator to cover his tracks. For instance, store audit data on write only
media, or house system A’s audit data on system B, and make sure that the two
system have different administrators. The more accountable your administrators
are, the less likely you are to have problems.
No comments:
Post a Comment